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Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate in innovation research as to which type of social capital is more 
conducive to innovation: structural holes as proposed by Burt or network closure as proposed 
by Coleman. Although Coleman focused on the quality of relationships, Burt argued that the 
structural configuration of relationships was more important. I argue that, instead of being 
alternative substitutes, Burt's social capital theory complements Coleman's theory. More 
precisely, I demonstrate that, in the presence of strong ties, weak network architectures 
(structural holes or a peripheral network position) leverage the strength of strong ties in the 
creation of innovation. This implies that weak network architectures have no value without 
strong ties, whereas strong ties have some value without weak network architectures but are 
leveraged by this type of structure. The findings indicate that innovation research tends to 
overestimate the impact of weak network architectures in the creation of innovation. By 
pointing to the necessity of strong ties, the results may be of particular interest for research on 
open innovation. They suggest that open innovation will not work if closed innovation 
principles are pushed back. 
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1. Introduction 
Research in the area of innovation management proposes that professional networks, 
that is, a person’s direct exchange partners and knowledge or other resources acquired 
through those partners (Lin, 2001), are central to the knowledge creation process (Amabile, 
1996; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; McFadyen et al., 2009; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Sociological theory offers two different views on how 
professional networks enhance knowledge generation. Although Coleman's view (1988, 1990) 
highlights the solidarity benefits of professional networks, Burt's view (1992, 1997a) focuses 
on information and control benefits. According to Coleman, the closure of professional 
networks makes actors more willing to share tacit knowledge (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
According to Burt, sparse networks with many structural holes provide access to a wide range 
of nonredundant information sources (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Both theoretical views motivated a large amount of empirical research; most of which 
assumed a tradeoff between both views and suggested that the validity of one of the views 
depended on task characteristics (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For example, Hansen (1999) showed 
that relatively complex, uncertain tasks benefited from closure, whereas less complex, certain 
tasks benefited from sparse networks. Uzzi (1997) made a similar point. However, Gabbay 
and Zuckerman's (1998) study found the opposite to be true: In basic research, which is 
typically characterized by complex, uncertain tasks, scientists benefit from sparse networks 
with many holes, whereas in applied research, which is typically characterized by 
noncomplex, certain tasks, scientists benefit from dense networks. Such ambiguous results 
have led other studies to propose that successful networks balance the benefits and risks of 
social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For example, Perry-Smith and Shalley (2003) argued 
that networks equilibrating solidarity, information, and control benefits offered the best 
opportunities to be creative at work. Empirical research supports this assumption by showing 
that most network measurements (network size, contact frequency, or network centrality) are 
inverted u-shaped related with knowledge creation (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Leenders et al., 
2007; McFadyen & Cannella, 2004; Rost, 2006; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005).  
In addition, there exists a rarely tested third explanation: Instead of being substitutes, 
Coleman and Burt may complement each other; that is, the assumption of a trade-off between 
both views is wrong. For example, McFadyen et al. (2009) showed that scientists who 
combined strong ties (measured by repeated publications with the same coauthors) with 
sparse networks (measured by the amount of realized publications with all possible coauthors) 
published most often in high impact journals. The results tend to support Coleman by 
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highlighting the solidarity benefits of strong ties and Burt by highlighting the information and 
control benefits of sparse networks. A similar point has been made in small-world research 
that integrates research on tie strength and structural holes (Lin et al., 1978; Milgram, 1967). 
Small-world research is characterized by a network structure that has both a high level of 
closure in addition to tie strength in the local cluster and a large number of weak bridging ties 
with other clusters. Within this research, it is suggested that teams or regions that incorporate 
the two conditions simultaneously (i.e., strong ties within the cluster and bridging ties with 
other clusters) are the most creative (Capaldo, 2007; Fleming et al., 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 
2005). “The implication advanced by small world research for future innovation studies is that 
both ties strength and structural holes need to be simultaneously examined. Rather than being 
perceived as two extremes of the same construct, they constitute two constructs residing 
within different network boundaries…” (Zheng, 2010: 168). 
This article considers recent research that states: “few (works) examined both the 
architecture of the network and the quality and content of the relationships … Given the 
additive contribution of the structural and relational dimensions to innovation, it seems 
promising to explore both dimensions in future studies of innovation…” (Zheng, 2010: 177). 
In the theoretical part, it is presented in detail that Coleman's view pays attention to the 
quality of relationships (tie strength), whereas Burt's view pays attention to the structural 
configuration of relationships (structural holes). As both authors analyzed different features of 
professional networks, their social capital theories do not contradict each other as often 
assumed in the former literature.  
For actors, it is possible to unite the solidarity benefits of strong ties with the 
information and control benefits of sparse networks. The hypothesis is that individuals who 
combine strong relationships with weak network architectures (e.g., structural holes or a 
peripheral network position) come up with the most innovative solutions. Former research on 
this topic is refined by pointing out that strong ties, not weak network architectures, are the 
essential element for innovation: It is proposed that weak network architectures have no value 
without strong ties, whereas strong ties without weak network architectures have at least some 
value. It follows that Burt's social capital theory on innovation complements Coleman's social 
capital theory on innovation; however, the reverse does not work. It is further argued that 
networks consisting of strongly interconnected elements (dense focal groups consisting of 
strong ties among actors) are not counterproductive for innovation. Network closure is created 
within groups and not as structural holes or a peripheral position beyond groups. By 
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neglecting the opportunities of a wider social structure, the concept of network closure 
erroneously assumes that individuals behave “atomized” as blindly obedient to group norms. 
To test the hypotheses, I analyzed key inventors of the German automotive industry. I 
collected egocentric survey data to measure the strength of professional relationships, 
coinventor data to measure structural features of professional networks, and time-lagged 
patent citation data to measure knowledge creation. The empirical design is in line with recent 
suggestions to elaborate network research (Zheng, 2010). It combines objective and subjective 
measurements to reduce common method biases and to improve construct validity, and it tests 
the causal link between social capital and innovation. The methodological improvements help 
to overcome some former research problems that mostly relied on affiliation networks 
(Capaldo, 2007; Fleming et al., 2007; McFadyen et al., 2009; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Although 
affiliation networks (coauthors, coinventors, or coprojects) capture the architecture of 
networks, they insufficiently measure the specific quality and content of relationships. They 
also do not allow for the control of human capital that is assumed to influence strongly social 
capital and innovation (Coleman, 1988). 
2. Social capital and innovation 
2.1. Coleman's view on social capital: relational embeddedness 
Within the literature, Coleman's view (1988, 1990) on social networks and 
correspondingly on social capital is classified as an internal or bonding view (Adler & Kwon, 
2002). This classification is substantiated by Coleman's focus on the emergence of effective 
norms that promote trustworthiness within an organization or community and thus strengthen 
social capital. It has led to the assumption that for Coleman the closure of the networks is an 
important prerequisite for social capital because “in a more open structure, violations of 
norms are more likely to go undetected and unpunished. People, thus, will be less trusting of 
one another, weakening social capital…” (Adler & Kwon, 2002: 24; see also Burt, 2001). 
Although it is true that Coleman stresses the importance of trustworthiness and effective 
norms in relationships, Coleman’s conclusion emphasizing the closure of networks is 
sometimes misunderstood. 
Coleman points out that the relationship quality between exchange partners is important 
to explain when social capital investments will capitalize. Underlying this concept is his 
theory of rational action in which each actor has control over certain resources and interests in 
certain resources and events (Coleman, 1990). Within this theory, social capital (relationships 
to other actors) constitutes a particular kind of resource available to an actor (Coleman, 1988, 
1990). For Coleman (1988), the value of social capital lies in “outstanding credit slips” on 
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both sides of a relationship explaining why "people are always doing things for each other… 
If A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this establishes an 
expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B. This obligation can be conceived as a 
credit slip held by A for performance by B. If A holds a large number of these credit slips, for 
a number of persons with whom A has relations, then the analogy to financial capital is 
direct…” (Section 102) 
In Coleman's approach, the specific quality of relationships therefore plays a major role. 
For example, if A’s exchange partners are not trustworthy, then debts will not be repaid. 
Further, in repeated exchanges, the payment of debts often occurs because the shadow of the 
future confronts exchange partners. Coleman therefore assumes that social capital investments 
are most valuable if individuals have strong ties with their exchange partners. Tie strength 
refers to the nature of a relationship that is a combination of the amount of time, emotional 
intensity, intimacy, and reciprocal services associated with the tie (Granovetter, 1973). The 
solidarity benefits of strong ties (intensive interactions characterized by mutual trust) become 
reflected in innovation: As credit slips will be paid back, they allow for the exchange of more 
complex and proprietary information (Hansen, 1999; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).  
Former empirical research tends to support this assumption by showing that frequent 
communication enhances innovation (Moran, 2005; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001; Smith et 
al., 2005) and, in particular, the radicalness of innovation (Landry et al., 2002). Sociological 
research further points to the strength of strong ties for assistance and help. For example, 
Wellman (1979) studied helping networks in a Toronto suburb and showed that 56 percent of 
the first closest-ranked intimates were relied upon in emergencies, whereas only 16 percent of 
the sixth closest-ranked intimates were relied upon. A similar point was made by Nelson 
(1989) who showed that strong ties prevented conflicts within organizations. 
The strength of an actor’s relationship with contacts, however, is conceptually distinct 
from network closure or correspondingly a lack of structural holes (Capaldo, 2007; 
Granovetter, 1973; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Zheng, 2010). First, Coleman never claimed 
that the emergence of effective norms always required network closure. Some types of social 
norms constituting a form of social capital are effective in the absence of relationships or in 
dispersed groups (Coleman, 1990). For example, the norm of generalized reciprocity explains 
why social capital investments are repaid by unknown strangers (Sahlins, 1972). This has 
been validated by recent experimental work showing that in one-shot situations people make 
use of sanctioning behavior (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Also rules of politeness, as demonstrated 
in Coleman (1990), are effectively achieved not only in small towns but also in big cities. 
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Coleman (1990) also points out the negative externalities of strong social norms in cohesive 
groups, for example, of elite norms that not only exclude nonmembers but also exercise 
strong behavioral pressure on group members. Second and often neglected, Coleman's social 
capital theory remains silent on the information and control benefits of social capital, which 
often occur due to structural embeddedness. Although information exchanges (everyday 
interactions to remain up-to-date) constitute a form of social capital, “the relations in this case 
are not valuable for the ‘credit slips’ they provide in the form of obligations that one holds for 
others' performances or for the trustworthiness of the other party but merely for the 
information they provide…” (Coleman, 1988: Section 104). It is therefore wrong to conclude 
that Coleman assumes that valuable social capital requires close, cohesive networks or a lack 
of structural holes. His theory remains rather salient on social capital opportunities emerging 
due to network structure, but he does extensively discuss why social capital investments are 
most valuable if relationships between exchange partners are rather strong.  
2.2. Burt's view on social capital: structural embeddedness 
The network literature classifies Burt's view (1992, 1997a) on social networks and 
correspondingly on social capital as an external or bridging view (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Burt 
primarily focused on external ties for competitive goals. He argued that a sparse network with 
few redundant ties provided great social capital benefits as individuals have the opportunity to 
broker the flow of information between groups and to act as entrepreneurs.  
Burt focused on the information and control consequences of social capital, which 
Coleman in large part excluded from his analysis. “An individual's position in the structure of 
… exchanges can be an asset in its own right … [Social capital] predicts that returns to 
intelligence, education, and seniority depend in some part on a person's location in the social 
structure of a market or hierarchy…” (Burt, 1997a: 339). Building on the strength of weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1973), the concept of network centrality (Freeman, 1977), and the power of 
having exclusive exchange partners (Cook, 1977), Burt developed the idea of structural holes; 
that is, of being the broker in relations between people who were otherwise disconnected in 
the social structure. 
In Burt's approach, the structural configuration of networks plays a major role. First, he 
hypothesized that networks rich in structural holes offered opportunities to broker the flow of 
information. That is, as receivers of less redundant information, people are better informed of 
opportunities or impending disasters, see new opportunities created by needs in one group that 
could be served by skills in other groups, and have more options of bringing together diverse 
individuals when it is rewarding. Second, he predicted that networks rich in structural holes 
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allowed entrepreneurial behavior by controlling the form of projects that bring together 
people from opposite sides of the hole: A person who adds value by brokering the connection 
between two others is the third person to benefit. Information and control benefits become 
reflected in innovation: Persons with contact networks rich in structural holes move 
information faster, know the parameters of emerging problems earlier, and tailor solutions to a 
specific group of individuals.  
Former empirical research tends to support this assumption by showing that structural 
holes enhance innovation (Fleming et al., 2007; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Reagans & 
Zuckerman, 2001; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Sociological studies further point to the strength of 
structural holes (or of bridging weak ties) for the diffusion of information. For example, 
Granovetter (1974) found in his empirical study of recent job changers that professional, 
technical, and managerial workers were more likely to hear about new jobs through weak ties 
(27.8 percent) than through strong ones (16.7 percent). Further, Lin et al.’s (1978) study that 
consisted of forwarding a booklet to designated but previously unknown target persons 
through a chain of personal acquaintances showed that successfully completed chains made 
much more use of weak ties.  
A similar idea has been developed in research concerned with a person’s position within 
a network (Freeman, 1977). The hypothesis is that individuals who occupy a peripheral 
network position enjoy the highest levels of creativity because they are more able to recognize 
new, divergent ideas and to take advantage of these ideas (Chubin, 1976; Fine & Kleinman, 
1979; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). Empirical research shows that individuals who combine 
a low closeness centrality in networks with a low amount of outside ties have the highest 
creativity (Perry-Smith, 2006).1 The negative effects of external ties contradict the assumption 
that new ideas mainly come from outside (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003), but it may be 
explained by the high maintenance costs of external ties (Perry-Smith, 2006) or by their low 
value with respect to tacit knowledge transfer (Hansen, 1999).  
2.3 Structural embeddedness as a complement for relational embeddedness 
The difference between Coleman and Burt reflects the difference between a relational 
versus structural interpretation of social capital (Granovetter, 1985). Coleman points out 
solidarity benefits arising from strong relationships. Burt points out information and control 
benefits arising from sparse networks. As the analysis of networks requires attention to the 
                                                      
 
1
 In a graph representing a social network, closeness centrality measures how close an actor is to all other actors 
in the graph.  
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quality of the constituent ties and to their configuration (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998; Wasserman & Faust, 1994), both views may complement each other. This 
should be true in particular with respect to the generation of new knowledge that calls for both 
information about opportunities and solid cooperation.  
The generation of new knowledge first requires opportunities to access knowledge, that 
is, whether it is possible to draw upon and engage with the existing and differing knowledge 
and the activities of various parties (Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; Moran & Ghoshal, 1996). 
According to Granovetter (1973), knowledge diffusion occurs by bridging weak ties, that is, 
by weak ties that connect different social circles and thus provide people with access to 
information and resources beyond those available in their own social circle. It suggests that 
the specific configuration of networks (a person’s position within a greater social structure) 
creates information and control benefits. Individuals with networks that include many 
structural holes (Burt, 1992) or individuals who occupy a peripheral position in a network 
(Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003) have more opportunities to come up with new ideas because 
they connect people with diverse perspectives, different outlooks, varying interests, and 
diverse approaches to problems (Ibarra, 1992; Lin et al., 1981; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). 
The generation of new knowledge also requires that the parties engaged in an exchange 
and combination will be able to recognize the value of new knowledge and to realize some 
new value created by their engagement (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). Friedkin (1980) points 
to the strength of strong ties for value recognition by proposing that “macro integration can be 
based on weak ties which permit episodic transmissions of information among groups, while 
micro integration is based on a cohesive set of strong ties which permit regular transmissions 
within groups.” (p. 421) Granovetter (1983) adds to the strength of strong ties for value 
realization: “strong ties have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more 
easily available.” (p. 209) All this suggests that the motivation and the ability of close 
exchange partners create solidarity benefits (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Exchange partners who 
trust each other and share competencies and expertise are in the best position to recognize 
knowledge and to create value: They understand each other, exchange tacit information, show 
a higher willingness to take risks, and have greater openness (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).   
The former arguments suggest a division of labor between weak network architectures 
and strong ties in the creation of innovation. Weak network architectures provide the bridges 
over which innovations cross the boundaries of social groups. However, the final decision 
making is influenced mainly by the strong ties to exchange partners. Weimann's (1980) study 
of an Israeli kibbutz with 280 members specifies that, in situations where actors have either 
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strong ties or weak network architectures, strong ties may be preferable with respect to 
innovation. He shows that only strong ties lead to swift, reflected actions because information 
moves faster and is more credible. This implies that weak network architectures without 
strong ties have no value: They do not lead to any action. Further, it follows that strong ties 
without weak network architectures have at least some value: They lead to actions, even 
though these actions may not be radically new.   
Hypothesis 1. Individuals with strong ties and weak network architectures (structural 
holes and a peripheral network position) come up with the most innovative solutions. 
Individuals with strong ties and strong network architectures2 come up with more 
innovative solutions than individuals with weak ties and weak network architectures.  
As demonstrated, research that contrasts Coleman with Burt sometimes reasons that 
networks consisting of strongly interconnected elements are counterproductive for innovation 
because they contain strong pressure to conform to group norms. A prominent example for 
strong group norms preventing innovation is the Not-Invented-Here syndrome (Katz & Allen, 
1982). It has led to the assumption that, with regard to innovation, “openness” may be better 
compared to “closeness.” Relying on this conclusion, one could expect that hypothesis 1 is 
also confirmed for network closure: In particular, dense networks consisting of strong ties 
prevent innovation.  
However, network closure is created within groups and not as structural holes or a 
peripheral position beyond groups (Burt, 2001). Formalizing the idea of structural 
embeddedness with the concept of network closure can result in an “oversocialization” of 
behavior. Individuals are assumed to behave “atomized” as blindly obedient to group norms 
while opportunities of a wider social structure are neglected (Granovetter, 1985). 
Consequently, network closure insufficiently describes the structural embeddedness of 
individuals and allows neither the implication about the amount of norm pressure imposed on 
actors nor one about possible bridges over which innovations may cross the boundaries of 
social groups.3 Therefore, it is not expected that actors who are embedded in networks 
                                                      
 
2
 Strong network architecture refers to networks that include few structural holes or to individuals who do not 
occupy a peripheral position in a network. 
3
 Networks within groups, be they weak or dense, offer few opportunities to access radical new knowledge. The 
probability to build local bridges (i.e., information cannot circle within the group if the person is removed) is 
low. Group members know each other because there is a tendency of one's friends' friends to be one's friends as 
well (Granovetter, 1973). If group members do not interact with each other, for example, in groups with weakly 
interconnected actors, they will at least know from each other and information indirectly reaches them via 
common acquaintance. 
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consisting of strongly interconnected elements (in dense social groups consisting of strong 
ties) have disadvantages with respect to knowledge creation. 
Hypothesis 2. Individuals with strong ties and strong network closure have no 
disadvantages with respect to the creation of innovative solutions.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 refer to independent concepts of embeddedness. The embeddedness 
in a wider social structure (Hypothesis 1) is conceptually different from the embeddedness in 
focal groups (Hypothesis 2). The main message is that the networks of persons embedded in 
dense focal groups do not automatically lack structural holes or a periphery whereas the 
networks of persons embedded in less dense focal groups do not automatically contain many 
structural holes or are located in the periphery of a wider social structure.   
3. Method 
3.1. Sample 
In year 2003, I collected a snowball sample of inventors from the German automotive 
industry.4 Relying on MIMOSA,5 a software package of the European Patent Office (EPO), 
the snowball method was applied in five steps and was limited to patent activities from 1991 
to 2002. It started with collaboration patents of large German automotive firms, namely, 
Daimler, BMW, Porsche, Volkswagen, Opel, and Audi. From these patents, I collected all 
further patents in which the listed inventors were involved. After five steps, it led to a total 
number of 9,941 inventors involved in 13,416 patents. I extracted the largest component of 
the patent collaboration network among these inventors, which allowed me to calculate 
measurements on network architecture. The network consisted of 1,788 inventors (see figure 
1). Of these inventors, 515 were identified in the first four steps; that is, I have complete data 
on their direct patent collaboration partners. The 515 inventors constitute the study 
                                                      
 
4
 Patent data are only appropriate measurements for knowledge outcomes in industries strongly relying on 
intellectual properties and are industry-specific (Harhoff & Reitzig, 2001; Michel & Bettels, 2001). I interviewed 
patent examiners to select an appropriate industry and choose the German automotive industry for the following 
reasons: First, in some technological areas (e.g., motor, drive train, mechatronics), the industry has been very 
innovative over the last decades and thus heavy relies on patents. Second, the German automotive industry only 
consists of a few major players. It allowed me to find a representative starting point for the snowball method. I 
interviewed the managers of a spin-off of these major players. It was supported that many innovations are 
developed in collaboration among the major firms. As the sample starts from collaborative patents, there is a 
high probability of including important technological inventions. One patent examiner reviewed the final sample. 
He validated that it includes technologies that should be protected by patents. 
5
 MIMOSA offers a range of functions for building, submitting, and saving queries on patents. I additionally 
cooperated with the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property. They helped us to collect the massive 
amount of patent data in the fifth step of the snowball sample. 
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population.6 Using the technology classes of the patents of the 9,941 inventors, I validated 
whether the patents of the 515 inventors mirrored the population of all patents. There were no 
significant differences.  
------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
In year 2003, I also contacted the 533 inventors by telephone. Of the 533, 147 were 
subsequently excluded from the sample because of movement, pension, death, or retirement. 
Overall, 386 inventors were usable for the analysis and were asked to participate in a survey. 
Of those surveyed, 142 returned completed questionnaires, yielding a response rate of 36 
percent. On the basis of different indicators (the technology classes, firm affiliation, 
application date of a patent, number of EP patents per inventor, and the answer date),7 I 
examined whether the return rate mirrored the selected sample. The differences between 
participants and nonparticipants were not significant. The participants, on average, had 24 
years of work experience, 19 years with the same company, and 11 years in the same division. 
They spent, on average, 40 percent of their working time on scientific and laboratory tasks, 
and, in 2003, each respondent published eight scientific papers, was involved in 20 patents, 
and two nondisclosures. They worked for 31 different companies with the biggest group 
working for Daimler AG. 
Patent collaboration data and survey data were collected to measure the social capital of 
inventors at time t. These data were subsequently combined with indicators measuring the 
innovativeness of the interviewed inventors at time t+1 or from 2004-2009. To measure 
innovativeness, I relied on patent citations explaining the large time lag in the data. In 2010, I 
measured whether and how often patents granted after the survey were cited by following 
inventions. Before collecting patent data on each inventor, I investigated whether the inventor 
still worked for the same company, ensuring that the patents were invented within the work 
                                                      
 
6
 Seventeen of the inventors identified in the first four stages were excluded because they were not a part of the 
main component.  
7
 I used a classification system for automotive patents that I developed in cooperation with industry experts and 
the patent examiner. The classification system uses the technology classes of patents but assigns each class to 
content-related categories. It helps to overcome the problem that patent classifications evolve over time, thus 
they are not always logically constructed. The original sample and response sample contain the following 
technologies: Components & Mechatronics (sample: 32.8%, response: 41.3%), Motor & Drive (sample: 27.7%, 
response: 19.2%), Landing Gear (sample: 13.8%, response:  16.6%), Car Inner Room (sample: 14.0%, response: 
11.5%), Car Body (sample: 10.10%, response: 8.9%), Special Vehicles (sample: 1.63%, response: 2.55%). In the 
response sample, Components & Mechatronics are weakly overrepresented, whereas Motor & Drive is weakly 
underrepresented. On an overall level, the included technologies of both samples are not significantly different. 
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context of 2003. In year 2009, 95 percent of the included inventors still worked for the same 
company. 
3.2. Dependent measurements to capture innovativeness   
Consistent with prior research, I used patent data to measure the novelty of inventor 
ideas (see, e.g., Balconi et al., 2004; Harhoff et al., 2003; Trajtenberg, 1990). Patents are 
direct outputs of industrial R&D and mirror the cumulative process of technological change. 
A problem with simple patent counts is that a small fraction of patents mostly accounts for the 
largest part of the value (Griliches, 1990; Harhoff et al., 2003). The literature therefore relies 
on patent citations to evaluate whether the contributions protected by a patent are more radical 
or more incremental (Narin, 1994; von Wartburg et al., 2005). When applying for a patent, the 
assignee has to prove the novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness of the invention. For this 
reason, both the inventor and a patent examiner, who has prior knowledge in the respective 
technological field, compare the invention. The patent application references the relevant 
sources for judging novelty and inventive steps. Patent citation analyses can be based either 
on “backward” measures (derived from the citations made by a patent) or on “forward” 
measures (derived from the citations that a patent subsequently receives from other patents). 
Forward citations have been identified as an appropriate measure of technological impact 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Nerkar, 2003). Backward citations, 
which are often excluded in the patent citation literature, measure the integrated knowledge 
base (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Jaffe et al., 1993). In the following, both measurements are 
used to evaluate whether the contributions of inventors protected by patents are more radical 
or incremental.   
Before introducing the patent citation measurements, it has to be mentioned that, like all 
citation measurements (Frey & Rost, 2010), patent citations have several drawbacks and 
should be interpreted as incomplete measurements of innovativeness (Griliches, 1990; Marx 
et al., 2009; Pavitt, 1985).8 This research relies on patent citations because, first, there is no 
alternative complete measurement of individual innovativeness. Second, for European patents 
where an independent authority, such as the patent examiner (von Wartburg et al., 2005), cites 
prior art, there is less reason to expect that the measurement errors of patent citation data are 
systematically correlated with the social capital of inventors. Third, in contrast to the citations 
of scholars, I am not aware that patent citations have an incentive effect that promotes 
                                                      
 
8
 In particular, not all inventions are patented. Firms may also decide to exploit intellectual property by other 
measures, such as keeping it secret or enforced copyright (Hall et al., 2001). Further, patent citation analyses 
assume that experts in the field comprehensively evaluate the processes, which is not always the case. 
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strategic behavior. For example, in Germany, employed inventors are paid in proportion to the 
economic benefit of their patents. Economic success, however, is different from patent 
citations, which capture the aspects of the technological progress of inventions. Nevertheless, 
I validated whether the patent citations of inventors in the time prior to the survey, 1998 to 
2002, mirrored their subjective evaluations on the innovativeness of their prior projects.9 The 
results supported significant correlations between backward and forward patent citations and 
subjective evaluations of innovativeness (for both: r=.23***). The correlation, however, was 
rather small, demonstrating that patent citations do not capture all aspects of individual 
innovativeness. 
Forward citations. Forward citations are the number of citations received by a patent. 
Counting the forward citations of patents shows whether patented inventions are mentioned—
either by examiners (as entities of prior knowledge confining the scope of claims) or by 
applicants or their lawyers (as an indication of prior art that is extended by the invention)—
when an inventor files for a new patent. Because they are a paper trail of codified knowledge 
(Jaffe et al., 1993), forward citations are considered an appropriate measure for technological 
impact, defined as an invention's impact on subsequent technological progress (Albert et al., 
1991; Nerkar, 2003). To measure sustainable technological progress, for each inventor, I 
counted how many citations that inventor’s patents, invented after the survey, received from 
subsequent inventions.10 I relied on the period from 2004 to 2009 to ensure that there was 
ample time for the citation of the patents. I did not correct the measurement with regard to a 
patent's likelihood of being cited due to membership in a certain cohort (e.g., denoted by its 
priority or publication year, see Dahlin et al., 2004) because all inventions were from the 
same time period and all the inventors from the same industry. However, I did control for 
                                                      
 
9
 Respondents assessed the average product innovativeness in their projects during the last years (1= below 20% 
of projects were new/ very radical; 5 = over 80% of projects were new/ very radical). The scale included 12 
items (Danneels & Kleinschmidt, 2001; Salomo, 2003). Six items measured dimensions of market familiarity, 
that is, to what degree the products were new from a market point of view. Included items were new customers 
for the firm, new competitors for the firm, a new array of products for the firm, new customer benefits for the 
branch of industry, a change in consumer attitudes for the branch of industry, and high changeover costs for the 
branch of industry. Six items measured dimensions of technology familiarity, that is, to which degree the 
products were new from a technological point of view. Included items were new technological solutions for the 
firm, performance improvements for the firm, new knowledge for the firm, new technological solutions for the 
branch of industry, performance improvements for the branch of industry, and new knowledge for the branch of 
industry. The scale showed a good reliability, that is, α = .856.  
10
 Citation data were gathered from PatBase (www.patbase.com). PatBase covers over 30 million patent families 
from the U.S., EP, PCT, GB, DE, and FR patent-issuing authorities from over 75 countries with historical 
information dating back to the early 1900s. The database is grouped into extended patent families with each 
unique invention representing one consolidated family. Grouping all equivalents of an invention eliminates the 
danger of counting the same invention multiple times in the data set. On the family level, the database offers 
citation counts, that is, the number of backward and forward citations per patent. The patents of each inventor 
were manually validated by using postal addresses and names of employers. 
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characteristics of the specific technological area in which inventors work (see control 
variables). 
Backward citations. Backward citations are citations made by a patent to a previously 
issued patent. Studies using backward citation information investigated spillovers, called 
“knowledge flows,” between technology classes (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Trajtenberg et 
al., 2002) or geographic regions (Jaffe et al., 1993; Tijssen, 2001). Other studies used 
backward citations as a means to analyze the localness of a technological search by 
organizations (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Podolny & Stuart, 1995). In general, a high 
number of backward citations shows that the invention is closely linked to relevant prior art 
and thus contributes to technological process (von Wartburg et al., 2005). For each inventor, I 
counted how many inventions were mentioned in that inventor’s patents that were invented 
after the survey (2004-2009). 
3.3. Independent measurements to capture social capital   
I collected patent collaboration data for 1991 to 2002 to measure the embeddedness of 
inventors in broader inventor networks (see Figure 1). I also collected egocentric network data 
for year 2003 to measure relationship quality and ego network closure. Egocentric networks 
select relevant exchange partners, called Alteri, from all contacts of a person, called Ego. To 
select relevant exchange partners, the method uses name generators. The respondents quote 
their network partners via name codes. I used name codes to identify exchange partners and to 
collect additional information about personal attributes or the kind of relationship. The 
egocentric method used in this study applies 10 name generators to identify work-related 
network partners of inventors. The literature suggests using multiple questions because people 
with a larger number of contacts are more likely to respond (Burt, 1997a). The wording of the 
name generators is listed in Table 1. Questions were developed by using prior studies on 
egocentric networks (Burt, 1992, 1997a). I adapted these questions to innovation topics 
(Hansen, 1999; Hauschildt & Gemünden, 1998).  
------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The instrument was pretested in a spin-off company of a major German automotive 
firm. The company employs 111 R&D employees in eight business units. I asked two 
employees, one department manager from each unit and the CEO, about their egocentric 
networks. In contrast to the final study design, the instrument was applied nonanonymously to 
investigate its appropriateness in capturing collaboration networks. I additionally asked each 
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Ego about the relationships between its Alteri. Figure 2 shows the resulting networks of the 
26 people. Overall, the 26 people named 184 different Alteri in their work-related contact 
networks, indicating that the instrument collects information on the expanding networks of 
actors. Sixty-three of the Alteri work in the same company indicating that more than 50 
percent of the employees were named. I presented the resulting network to those interviewed, 
and there was overall agreement that I had measured important work-related exchanges in the 
firm. In year 2003, the egocentric instrument was applied to the snowball sample. In total, it 
identified 1,905 job-related network partners of the 142 respondents. The average number of 
persons named in the different name generators is documented in Table 1.  
------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
In the following, a theoretical model and an empirical measurement model are 
introduced to measure tie strength, ego network closure, structural holes, and a peripheral 
network position. The theoretical model exclusively relies on proxies that the social network 
literature has introduced to measure the different network concepts. The empirical model 
builds on the results of a factor analysis (see Table 2), that is, on empirically extracted 
dimensions that capture different aspects of networks. In contrast to the theoretical model, the 
empirical model has the advantage that multicollinearity—a major problem in network 
studies—is reduced. It has, however, the disadvantage that it additionally includes network 
variables that are normally not used to represent the constructs tie strength, ego network 
closure, structural holes, and peripheral network position. In the following, both alternative 
measurement approaches are used to predict innovativeness. The empirical measurement 
model is discussed in more detail because multicollinearity problems are smaller and 
construct validity may be improved by using many proxies.  
------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Strength of ties. In the empirical model, tie strength is operationalized by eight items 
that describe the relationship quality between Ego and each Alter. Contact frequency shows 
how frequently Ego and Alter have contact with each other (1=irregularly, 2=monthly, 
3=weekly, 4=daily, 5=several times a day). Emotional closeness between Ego and Alter is 
measured by trustworthiness, that is, whether Ego trusts Alter with essential project details 
almost blindly (1=is not true through 5=is true) and sure handedness/reliability, whether Alter 
keeps promises (1=never through 5=always). Cognitive closeness between Ego and Alter is 
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measured by the proximity in professional backgrounds (1=very different through 5=very 
close), the overlap of technological knowledge (1=very low through 5=very high), and 
subjective evaluations of creativity/innovativeness (1=not innovative/creative through 5=very 
innovative/creative). Finally, two items capturing the amount of resource access also show 
high factor loadings. The first item measures the hierarchical position of each Alter (0=lower 
hierarchical position, 1=same hierarchical position, 2=higher hierarchical position) and the 
second item or the level of training and education (1=apprenticeship through 5=PhD). The 
eight items show a good reliability, α = .92. I built a final measurement of ties strength by 
calculating the mean value of the eight items and standardized the new variable so that the 
maximum amounted to one. 
In the theoretical model, tie strength is operationalized by contact frequency, 
trustworthiness, and sure handedness. The three items showed good reliability, α = .81. 
Ego network closure. In the empirical model, ego network closure is measured by ego 
network size and exchange multiplexity, as identified in the egocentric method. The pretest 
showed that both measurements could be used to capture ego network density (see Figure 
3).11 Small ego networks with high exchange multiplexity are typically denser than large ego 
networks with low exchange multiplexity. Ego network size indicates how many Alteri were 
named by Ego. I counted the reverse value, that is, higher numbers indicate smaller networks, 
and I standardized the new variable so that the maximum was one. Exchange multiplexity 
counts how often an Alter is named by Ego in different exchanges, that is, in different name 
generators (Burt, 1997b). For each Ego, I calculated the average multiplexity of the 
relationships, indicating the average number of exchange contents that are shared with an 
Alter. Exchange multiplexity again was standardized with a maximum of one. Finally, I built 
a new additive measurement of ego network closure where a maximum of one indicates small, 
multiplex networks. 
------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
                                                      
 
11
 The completion of the Alter-Alteri relationship matrix is very time-consuming. I therefore decided to drop this 
matrix from the final questionnaire. 
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In the theoretical model, ego network closure is measured by Ego's network density in 
patent collaboration networks. Ego network density captures the amount of realized 
collaborations with all possible coinventors.12  
Structural holes. In the empirical model, structural holes were measured by the size of 
and the constraint in patent collaboration networks. Inventors who collaborated with many 
different persons who did not collaborate with other of Ego's alters are assumed to have 
networks rich in structural holes. The size of patent collaboration networks measures how 
many different inventors a person collaborated with via patents from 1991 to 2002. The 
measurement was standardized so that the maximum was one. The constraint in patent 
collaboration networks was measured with Burt's adjustment of constraint (Burt, 1992). It 
measures the extent to which Ego is invested in people who are invested in other of Ego's 
alters. I counted the reverse value (the higher numbers indicate networks without constraint) 
and standardized the new variable so that the maximum was one. Finally, I built a new 
additive measurement of structural holes where the maximum of one indicates large networks 
without constraint. 
In the theoretical model, structural holes are operationalized by Burt's adjustment of 
constraint. 
Peripheral position. In the empirical model, a peripheral network position is measured 
by an actor’s closeness centrality in patent collaboration networks and the amount of contacts 
outside the company. Inventors who have a low closeness centrality in patent collaboration 
networks and a low amount of external contacts are assumed to have peripheral network 
positions (see also Perry-Smith, 2006). The closeness centrality measures the mean geodesic 
distance (the shortest path) between an actor and all other actors in the patent collaboration 
network reachable from it (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The variable was standardized so that 
the maximum was one. The amount of external contacts was calculated from the ego network 
survey and indicates Ego's investments in contacts outside the company. I built a new additive 
measurement of peripheral network position where smaller values indicate peripheral actors 
with few external ties and larger values indicate central actors with many external ties. 
In the theoretical model, a peripheral network is operationalized by an actor’s closeness 
centrality in patent collaboration networks. 
                                                      
 
12
 Patent collaboration networks contain a high proportion of weak ties that can contaminate the validity of the 
density measurement. The density measurement of the empirical measurement model may be therefore more 
suitable.  
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3.4. Control measures 
Technological area. I controlled for characteristics of the specific technological area in 
which inventors work. I measured the speed of technological change (1=fast technological 
changes through 7=slow technological improvements) and the availability of knowledge 
(1=few documented technological knowledge through 7=fast growing amount of 
technological knowledge). For inventors working in slow-changing technological areas that 
include less documented knowledge, the exploration of new knowledge may be easier 
(Henderson, 1996).  
Personal characteristics. I controlled for the personal characteristics of inventors. First, 
their job engagement was included. The scale consists of 15 items measuring the (self-
evaluated) organizational citizenship behavior of the interviewed persons with respect to 
innovation-related behavior (Hauschildt & Gemünden, 1998), for example, knowledge 
support or gate-keeping (1=no engagement to 5=high engagement). The items show a good 
reliability, α = .866. For every participant, I calculated the mean value of the 15 items. 
According to the literature, organizational citizenship behavior improves certain performance 
indicators in firms (Podsakoff et al., 1997). Second, for each inventor, I measured the 
hierarchical position (1=subordinate through 5=executive), the highest education level 
(1=apprenticeship through 5=PhD), and the work experience in years. All items are indicators 
of the amount of competences and resources of inventors facilitating the creation of new 
knowledge.  
Patent characteristics. Finally, on the patent level, I controlled for the number of 
patents, the average number of involved inventors, and the average priority year. Inventors 
involved in many patent applications have a higher probability of being cited. Further, a larger 
number of inventors per patent indicates greater competence behind the invention, and, 
ultimately, a higher likelihood of a patent being cited as relevant prior art (Gittelman & 
Kogut, 2003; Rost, 2006; Wuchty et al., 2007). Finally, older patents have a higher likelihood 
of being cited (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Lettl et al., 2009). 
Table A-1 in the appendix documents the descriptive statistics and the correlations of 
the included variables. 
3.5. Statistical method 
I relied on a negative binomial regression rather than an OLS regression because the 
dependent variable (number of patent citations) cannot be less than zero (Gittelman & Kogut, 
2003; Nerkar, 2003; Sorenson & Fleming, 2004). Further, the distribution of patent citation 
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counts is skewed because a small number of patents in a given technological field regularly 
account for the majority of forward or backward citations (Scherer & Harhoff, 2000).  
For all network measurements, I additionally included the quadratic term. As shown in 
prior research, social capital contains benefits and risks implying that benefits cannot 
maximize ad infinitum; at a certain point, risks prevail (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Perry-Smith & 
Shalley, 2003).  
4. Results 
4.1. Results by using the empirical measurement model of social capital 
Tables 3 and 4 document the regression results predicting the knowledge base 
(backward citations) and the technological impact (forward citations) of patents invented in 
the time period after the survey by using the empirical measurement model. The regression 
models are computed in four steps. First, I included the control variables, second the linear 
effects of network measurements, third their quadratic effects, and fourth the interaction 
effects of network architecture and ties strength.   
------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The findings first indicated that all network measurements exerted no linear effects on 
innovativeness (see column II, Tables 3 and 4). Effects are significant if quadratic effects are 
included. In line with former research, the findings support inverted u-shaped relationships 
between social capital and innovativeness suggesting that inventors with balanced social 
capital investments come up with the most innovative solutions. The results also show that 
inventors acting in networks rich in structural holes, but not so rich that a person can act 
completely autonomously, and inventors with a peripheral network position, but not so 
peripheral that other actors cannot be reached, integrate most prior knowledge (backward 
patent citations, see column III, Table 3). Further, the inventions of persons embedded in 
close ego networks, but not so dense that exchanges become too redundant, and the inventions 
of persons with a peripheral network position, but not so peripheral that other network actors 
cannot be reached, have the highest impact on future technological knowledge (forward patent 
citations, see column III, Table 4).  
Second, the findings indicated that tie strength interacts with network architecture. The 
interaction with structural holes (Table 3, column IV) and the interactions with structural 
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holes and peripheral network position (Table 4, column IV) are significant.13 I found no 
significant interactions with network closure. Figure 4 illustrates the significant findings and 
shows the marginal effects of network architecture on innovativeness for inventors with 
strong relationships to their core exchange partners (calculated for one standard deviation 
above the mean value of ties strength) and inventors with weak relationships to their core 
exchange partners (calculated for one standard deviation below the mean value of ties 
strength). The figure additionally includes significant human capital indicators to illustrate the 
magnitude of social capital effects. 
------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
According to Figure 4, inventors who combine strong ties to their exchange partners 
with structural holes in their broader networks integrate a larger knowledge base of prior 
technologies (backward citations), and their inventions get cited more often by following 
inventions (forward citations) compared to inventors who combine weak ties with structural 
holes. The amount of structural holes should be not too high because of diminishing returns. 
For example, the patents of inventors having stronger relationships with their exchange 
partners and a medium amount of structural holes account on average for 34.8 backward and 
6.7 forward citations. In contrast, the patents of inventors having weaker relationships with 
their exchange partners and a medium amount of structural holes account on average for 3.8 
backward and 0.06 forward citations. Stronger ties are also more beneficial than weaker ties if 
network architectures consist of a suboptimal amount of structural holes. The patents of 
inventors with stronger relationships and no structural holes account on average for 6.0 
backward and 4.1 forward citations, whereas the patents of inventors with weaker 
relationships and no structural holes account on average for 1.0 backward and 0.05 forward 
citations. Further, the patents of inventors with stronger relationships and a maximum of 
structural holes account on average for 1.7 backward and 1.1 forward citations, whereas the 
patents of inventors with weaker relationships and a maximum of structural holes account on 
average for 0.9 backward and 0.00 forward citations. The last results also demonstrate that 
with respect to innovation a lower, and not a higher, amount of structural holes is more 
beneficial.  
                                                      
 
7
 I also ran robustness tests by including only significant effects of the regression results in columns IV. It did 
not change the results. 
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The regression analysis predicts similar effects for peripheral network positions. The 
patents of inventors, who combine stronger ties to their exchange partners with a peripheral 
network position in their broader networks, are cited more often by following patent 
submissions (forward citations) compared to inventors who combine weak ties with a 
peripheral network position. For example, the patents of inventors having stronger 
relationships with their exchange partners and occupying decentral, but not too peripheral, 
network positions account on average for 4.1 forward citations. In contrast, the patents of 
inventors having weaker relationships with their exchange partners and occupying the same 
network positions account on average for 1.0 forward citations. The results further indicate 
that with respect to network centrality stronger ties are not always superior. Strong ties pay 
off for persons occupying a peripheral network position. However, if inventors move in the 
center of networks, weak relationships become more advantageous. For example, the patents 
of inventors having weaker relationships with their exchange partners and occupying more 
central, but not too central, network positions account on average for 1.4 forward citations. In 
contrast, the patents of inventors having stronger relationships with their exchange partners 
and occupying the same network positions account on average for 1.2 forward citations. Even 
though the differences are small, the findings indicate the advantages of weak ties for central 
actors and the advantages of strong ties for peripheral actors.  
Finally, a comparison of social capital with human capital allows one to imagine the 
magnitude of the former effects. In the regression model, predicting backward citations of the 
human-capital-indicator work experience was positive and significant. Persons with a 
maximum of work experience integrated 22.3 prior technologies in their inventions, whereas 
persons with a minimum of work experience integrated 7.9 prior technologies. In comparison, 
persons with strong ties and an optimal amount of structural holes integrated 34.8 prior 
technologies in their inventions, whereas persons with weak ties and a maximum of structural 
holes integrated 0.09 prior technologies. Social capital investments thus exert more distinct 
effects on the breadth of integrated knowledge than human capital investments.  
In the regression model that predicted forward citations, the highest level of education 
of the inventors was positive and significant. Patents of persons holding a PhD were cited 4.9 
times by following technologies, whereas the patents of persons with an apprenticeship were 
cited 0.9 times. In comparison, the patents of persons with strong ties and an optimal amount 
of structural holes accounted for 6.7 forward citations, whereas the patents of persons with 
weak ties and a maximum of structural holes accounted for 0.00 forward citations. Further, 
the patents of persons with strong ties and a more peripheral network position accounted for 
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4.1 forward citations, whereas the patents of persons with weak ties and a maximum of 
decentrality with strong ties plus a maximum of centrality accounted for 0.00 forward 
citations. All this suggests that social capital investments have equal or even more 
pronounced effects on the technological impact of generated knowledge than human capital 
investments. 
4.2. Results by using the theoretical measurement model of social capital 
Finally, a test was made to determine whether the results were stable if the theoretical 
measurements of social capital were used. Table 5 and Figure 5 document the results. The 
findings again indicate that tie strength interacts with network architecture. With respect to 
backward patent citations, the interactions of tie strength with structural holes and peripheral 
network position are significant. With respect to forward patent citations, the interaction of tie 
strength with structural holes is significant. Again, there is no significant interaction of tie 
strength with network closure even though a different measurement is applied. Figure 5 
illustrates the significant findings. It shows that inventors who combined strong ties to their 
exchange partners with structural holes in their broader networks integrated a larger 
knowledge base of prior technologies (backward citations), and their inventions were cited 
more often by following inventions (forward citations) compared to inventors who combined 
weak ties with structural holes. In contrast to the former findings, structural holes have no 
diminishing returns on forward citations. With respect to peripheral network positions, I 
found no significant results for forward citations, but I did for backward citations. However, 
the discovered relationship is similar to the former one. The patents of inventors who 
combined stronger ties to their exchange partners with a peripheral network position in their 
broader networks integrated a larger knowledge base of prior technologies (backward 
citations) compared to inventors who combined weak ties with a peripheral network position. 
The results again indicate that with respect to network centrality stronger ties are not always 
superior. Strong ties pay off for persons occupying a peripheral network position. If persons 
move in the center of networks, weak relationships become more advantageous.  
------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 and Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4.3. Conclusion from the empirical results 
The empirical findings support strong ties to exchange partners as a prerequisite for the 
creation of innovation. A combination of strong ties with a certain amount of structural holes 
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or in particular a more peripheral network position facilitates innovation. According to the 
findings, weak ties are only beneficial if actors occupy a more central network position. The 
advantages of weak ties in centralized networks seem to be smaller or more risky than the 
advantages of strong ties in decentralized networks. I therefore conditionally accept 
hypothesis 1: It has been hypothesized that individuals with strong ties and weak network 
architectures (structural holes and peripheral network positions) come up with the most 
innovative solutions and that individuals with strong ties but without weak network 
architectures come up with more innovative solutions than individuals without strong ties but 
with weak network architectures. The empirical results further show no evidence that network 
closure significantly interacts with tie strength. I conditionally accept hypothesis 2. It has been 
suggested that actors who are embedded in networks consisting of strongly interconnected 
elements (in dense social groups consisting of strong ties) have no disadvantages with respect 
to knowledge creation.   
5. Conclusion 
This research contrasted two alternative views on social capital. Although Coleman's 
view pays attention to the quality of relationships (tie strength), Burt's view pays attention to 
the structural configuration of relationships (structural holes). Most former research assumes a 
trade-off between both views. I show that instead of being substitutes Burt complements 
Coleman. I point out the strength of strong ties in the creation of innovation. Strong ties 
ensure solidarity benefits that are important for the tacit characteristics of innovations, that is, 
knowledge recognition and realization. Strong ties however become most beneficial when 
combined with weak network architectures. Weak network architecture, such as networks 
including some structural holes (however not too many) or decentralized network positions 
(however not too peripheral), offer information and control benefits important for opportunity 
seeking (knowledge access). Therefore, actors invested in strong ties and embedded in weak 
network architectures come up with the most innovative solutions: They are able to recognize 
and realize the value of accessed knowledge.  
The findings in particular point out that innovation research tends to overestimate the 
impact of weak network architecture in the creation of innovation. First, the information and 
control advantages of weak network architectures are only beneficial if actors are able to 
recognize and realize the underlying value. Value recognition and realization requires strong 
social ties. Weak network architectures thus can only constitute a side condition multiplying 
the existing solidarity benefits of strong relationships. Second, the weakest network 
architectures do not offer the highest information and control benefits. Structural holes or 
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peripheral network positions have diminishing returns, suggesting that balanced network 
architectures are superior. Third, the same conclusion holds with respect to tie strength. As 
indicated by the regression results in Column IV of Tables 3 and 4, tie strength is also an 
inverted u-shaped relationship to innovativeness. It suggests that, even though stronger ties 
are more beneficial than weaker ties, ties should not become too strong.  
Further, it has been shown that networks consisting of strongly interconnected elements 
(dense focal groups consisting of strong ties among actors) are not counterproductive for 
innovation. In theory, it suggests that the difference between Coleman and Burt could be 
conceptualized better by the concepts of tie strength and weak network architecture, not by 
the concepts of tie strength and network closure. For managerial practice, it suggests that 
innovative organizations may consist of dense social circles (e.g., stable work groups) or open 
social circles (e.g., project work groups). What is important is whether employees have the 
possibility to create strong relationships with some exchange partners and to be embedded in 
a few bridging relationships beyond their focal work groups. 
With respect to further research, the findings may be interesting for the concept of 
"Open Innovation" (Chesbrough, 2003). Open innovation can be described as combining 
internal and external ideas as well as internal and external paths to advance the development 
of new technologies. In recent years, many companies have shifted from so-called closed 
innovation processes toward a more open way of innovating, for instance, through 
cooperation with suppliers and competitors or through active searches for new technologies 
and ideas outside of the firm. Although the results confirm the basic idea of combining closed 
innovation principles with open innovations principles for competitive advantages, they also 
point out some caveats. First, open innovation will not work if closed innovation principles 
are pushed back. Second, in particular, balanced open innovation principles may be 
beneficial. A similar conclusion was drawn some years ago by Slappendel (1996). Research 
can analyze both conditions in more detail. It may prevent open innovation from turning into 
a management fashion that enacts the realities that it describes but is unable to fulfill its 
promises (Callon, 2007).   
This research has several limitations that are important when interpreting the empirical 
results. First, patent data are incomplete measures of individual innovativeness. Even though 
there is validation that patent citations capture some aspects of innovativeness, they do not 
capture all aspects. Second, the study sample is rather small, implying less precise estimates. 
Even though I am optimistic that a larger sample would result in similar conclusions, this has 
to be validated. Third, the patent citation counts used in this study relied on single-stage 
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citation information. Yet, other studies used multistage citation analyses and bibliographical 
coupling to assess the technological importance or the “basicness” of inventions (Trajtenberg 
et al., 2002; von Wartburg et al., 2005). Multistage citation analyses and bibliographical 
coupling may offer more precise measures of knowledge creation by considering path 
dependency.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
Patent Collaboration Network of the Study 
 
Legend: The figure shows the patent collaborations between 1,788 inventors forming the largest component of 
the collaboration network identified by the snowball method. Pink circle-in-boxes indicate inventors identified in 
the first stage of the snowball method, that is, involved in collaboration patents between large German 
automotive firms. Blue circles indicate inventors identified in the second, third, or fourth stage of the snowball 
method. Pink and blue inventors, overall 515, constitute the study sample. Grey squares indicate inventors 
identified in the fifth stage of the snowball method.   
 
Das Bildelement mit der Beziehungs-ID rId12 wurde in der Datei nicht gefunden.
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Figure 2 
Pre-test of the name generator in one R&D firm  
 
Legend: Collaboration networks of 26 R&D employees (pink circle-in-box) within (blue circle) and outside 
(grey square) their company. The analysis considers the relationships between Ego's Alteri as indicated by Ego. 
The network consists of one component.   
 
  
Das Bildelement mit der Beziehungs-ID rId13 wurde in der Datei nicht gefunden.
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Figure 3 
External Validity of Ego Network Closure 
 
Legend: Relationship between ego network density and a simplified measurement of core network closure 
calculated from exchange multiplexity and the reciprocal value of ego network size (r=.440*). 
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Figure 4 
Empirical measurement model: Social capital, human capital, and innovation  
 
 
 
Legend:  
Marginal effects (see Tables 3 and 4, column IV).  
Weak ties = mean(strength of ties)-SD(strength of ties).  
Strong ties = mean(strength of ties)+SD(strength of ties).  
Das Bildelement mit der Beziehungs-ID rId15 wurde in der Datei nicht gefunden.
Das Bildelement mit der Beziehungs-ID rId16 wurde in der Datei nicht gefunden.
Das Bildelement mit der Beziehungs-ID rId17 wurde in der Datei nicht gefunden.
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Figure 5 
Theoretical measurement model: social capital and innovation 
 
 
 
Legend:  
Marginal effects (see Table 5).  
Weak ties = mean(strength of ties)-SD(strength of ties).  
Strong ties = mean(strength of ties)+SD(strength of ties).  
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistic of the ego network measurements 
Please name those persons from within or from outside your company with which you are 
currently related in the following relationships. Mean SD N 
With which persons you work frequently in projects together? 5.52 2.13 142 
With which persons you regular exchange information and knowledge about professional issues, 
e.g. new developments or new problem solutions? 
3.76 2.02 142 
Assume that you have to solve a tricky and specialized development task, for which only little 
documented knowledge is available. Which persons would you ask for assistance? 
3.43 1.60 142 
Which persons you ask for assistance in the initial stage of a project, e.g. by the search of ideas. 3.00 1.68 142 
Which persons you ask for assistance in the implementation stage of projects, e.g., transferring 
results into other operational departments. 
2.30 1.24 142 
Which persons you ask for assistance in the final stage of project, e.g., project management 2.45 1.40 142 
Please name those persons of your direct work environment, who actively encourage an 
innovation process by means of specific knowledge. In particular, those persons who are proven 
technical and/or procedure-specific experts in innovation projects and who assist by the 
development of new products or procedure. 
2.99 1.73 142 
Please name those persons of your direct work environment, who actively promote an innovation 
process by means of hierarchic power. In particular, those persons who order sanctions against 
opponents and provide protection for those who are in favor of innovation. 
2.31 1.27 142 
Please name those persons of your direct work environment, who actively arbitrate between the 
technical and economic world by means of organizational knowledge. In particular, those persons 
who recognize organizational hurdles and contribute to innovation processes through their 
negotiation capabilities. 
2.47 1.35 142 
Please name those persons of your direct work environment, who actively encourage an 
innovation process by means of innovation-related business relationships inside and outside the 
organization. In particular, those persons who initiate, design, and foster relationships to 
important actors and third parties. 
2.42 1.48 142 
Please name those persons of your direct work environment, who actively support cross-
organizational knowledge transfer. In particular, those persons who assist and help by searching 
out and evaluating external technical information. 
2.38 1.43 142 
Which persons you accept as your direct supervisors?  1.97 1.19 142 
Which persons have in the past contributed to your career?  3.36 1.24 142 
Which persons will in the future contribute to your career? 2.26 .90 142 
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Table 2 
Dimensions of social capital in the empirical measurement model 
Items/  
Factor Loadings 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Strength 
of ties 
Ego Network 
Closure 
Structural 
Holes 
Peripheral 
Position 
Overall 
Alteri's perceived creativity/innovativeness 2.91 0.71 1.80 5.00 .90       
Alteri's level of education 3.04 0.75 1.83 5.00 .88       
Alteri's trustworthiness 2.70 0.89 1.33 5.00 .83       
Alteri's amount of sector-specific knowledge 3.24 0.69 1.89 5.00 .82       
Alteri's specialist-knowledge-proximity 3.09 0.76 1.62 5.00 .78       
Alteri's sure-handedness/ reliability 3.16 0.76 1.00 5.00 .76       
Alteri's hierarchical position 1.26 0.40 0.42 2.00 .76       
Ego-Alteri contact frequency  2.29 0.97 0.92 5.00 .71     
Ego's social network size 12.66 6.46 3.00 41.00   -.95     
Ego's social exchange multiplexity 3.55 1.36 1.24 7.50   .74     
Ego's constraint in patent collaboration networks 0.55 0.26 0.15 1.13     -.93   
Ego's patent collaboration's network size 19.73 28.98 1.00 181.00     .91   
Percentage of external Alteri in Ego's social network 0.17 0.18 0.00 1.00       .83 
Ego's  closeness centrality in patent collaboration networks 10.96 2.56 0.19 14.53     .62 
Explained Variance    38.36 16.70 11.95 7.74 74.74 
Cronbachs Alpha    .92 - - - 
N    142 
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Table 3 
Empirical measurement model: Social capital and integration of prior technological 
knowledge 
Dependent variable: 
Backward patent citationst5 
I  II  III  IV   
Strength of Ties
 t0     .415   11.354   31.793  *  
   (.958)  (6.688)  (14.726)   
Strength of Ties Square
 t0     -7.73  -15.573 **  
     (5.137)  (5.765)   
Ego Network Closuret0   -1.384  -.867  6.157   
   (.734)  (4.247)  (9.598)   
Ego Network Closure Square
 t0     -.293  -2.319   
     (3.733)  (3.632)   
Structural Holes
 t0   .297  5.848 ** 2.052   
   (.719)  (2.107)  (2.692)   
Structural Holes
 
Square
 t0     -6.463 ** -9.484 ***  
     (2.212)  (2.35)   
Peripheral Position
 t0   -.197  6.204 ** 19.206   
   (1.1)  (2.378)  (12.546)   
Peripheral Position Square
 t0     -7.426 ** -10.337 ***  
     (2.698)  (2.786)   
Strength of Ties
 t0 x Ego Network Closure t0          -10.413    
       (17.762)   
Strength of Ties
 t0 x Structural Holes t0          12.128  **  
       (4.287)   
Strength of Ties
 t0 x Peripheral Position t0          -23.244    
       (25.584)   
Fast vs. slow technological change
 t0 -.024  -.07  -.174 * -.210 **  
 (.056)  (.068)  (.072)  (.072)   
Few vs. many documented knowledge
 t0 -.189 ** -.141  -.187 * -.235 **  
 (.07)  (.077)  (.086)  (.087)   
Job engagement
 t0 .248  .317  .416 * .323   
 (.21)  (.218)  (.207)  (.218)   
Hierarchical position
 t0 .149  .143  .232 * .283 **  
 (.105)  (.103)  (.107)  (.105)   
Highest education
 t0 .084  .034  .128  .141   
 (.116)  (.123)  (.13)  (.133)   
Work experience in years
 t0 .006  .007  .012  .027 *  
 (.01)  (.011)  (.011)  (.012)   
Average inventors per patent
 t0 .424 *** .434 *** .42 *** .443 ***  
 (.066)  (.077)  (.072)  (.072)   
Average priority year per patent t0 -.297 * -.295 * -.179  -.104   
 (.12)  (.122)  (.121)  (.119)   
Number of patents
 t0 .143 *** .137 *** .153 *** .159 ***  
 (.015)  (.016)  (.016)  (.015)   
_cons 595.324 * 591.146 * 351.316  193.4   
 (239.578)  (244.432)  (243.38)  (240.001)   
Pseudo R2 .1151   .1183   .1352   .1461    
LR chi2 141.08 *** 144.95 *** 165.72 *** 179.04 ***  
Log likelihood -542.17  -540.24  -529.85  -523.20   
Likelihood-ratio test (df) -   3.86   20.77 *** 13.33 **  
N 142   142   142  142   
Legend:  
Negative binomial regression 
*** p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
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Table 4 
Empirical measurement model: Social capital and creation of new technological knowledge 
Dependent variable:  
Forward patent citations
 t5 
I  II  III  IV  
Strength of Ties
 t0     1.351   4.083   60.653 ** 
   (1.224)  (9.059)  (20.055)  
Strength of Ties Square
 t0     -2.336  -17.638 * 
     (6.832)  (7.527)  
Ego Network Closuret0   1.647  16.166 * 21.607  
   (1.189)  (7.174)  (13.188)  
Ego Network Closure Square
 t0     -12.594 * -13.468 * 
     (6.075)  (5.828)  
Structural Holes
 t0   .405  1.64  -2.585  
   (.895)  (3.07)  (3.891)  
Structural Holes
 
Square
 t0     -1.986  -4.226  
     (3.11)  (3.258)  
Peripheral Position
 t0   .726  11.736 *** 50.861 ** 
   (1.519)  (3.147)  (15.647)  
Peripheral Position Square
 t0     -13.239 *** -17.958 *** 
     (3.638)  (3.792)  
Strength of Ties
 t0 x Ego Network Closure t0       -10.964  
       (22.496)  
Strength of Ties
 t0 x Structural Holes t0       10.825 * 
       (5.378)  
Strength of Ties
 t0 x Peripheral Position t0       -76.883 * 
       (31.925)  
Fast vs. slow technological change
 t0 -.008  .005  -.063  -.106  
 (.074)  (.086)  (.093)  (.092)  
Few vs. many documented knowledge
 t0 -.146  -.104  -.164  -.216  
 (.094)  (.107)  (.112)  (.119)  
Job engagement
 t0 .322  .336  .366  .308  
 (.285)  (.288)  (.291)  (.294)  
Hierarchical position
 t0 -.142  -.116  -.107  -.108  
 (.139)  (.141)  (.16)  (.155)  
Highest education
 t0 .084  .192  .298  .431 * 
 (.159)  (.175)  (.170)  (.176)  
Work experience in years
 t0 -.002  -.008  .009  .030  
 (.015)  (.016)  (.017)  (.018)  
Average inventors per patent
 t0 .321 *** .358 *** .287 ** .340 *** 
 (.084)  (.096)  (.089)  (.092)  
Average priority year per patent t0 -.421 * -.472 ** -.24  -.124  
 (.172)  (.172)  (.17)  (.171)  
Number of patents
 t0 .156 *** .156 *** .172 *** .180 *** 
 (.021)  (.022)  (.021)  (.020)  
_cons 842.21 * 943.26 ** 469.577  212.981  
 (345.348)   (345.156)   (341.462)   (344.228)   
Pseudo R2 .1511  .1574  .1794  .2012  
LR chi2 105.09 *** 109.48 *** 124.76 *** 139.97 *** 
Log likelihood -295.25  -293.06  -285.42  -277.81  
Likelihood-ratio test (df) -  4.39  15.28 ** 15.22 ** 
N  142  142  142  142  
Legend:   
Negative binomial regression 
*** p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
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Table 5 
Theoretical measurement model: Social capital and technological knowledge 
Dependent variable: Backward patent citationst5  Forward patent citations t5  
Strength of Ties t0 28.514 † 25.405  
 (15.027)  (26.833)  
Strength of Ties Square t0 -8.142 † -2.260  
 (4.42)  (5.375)  
Ego Network Closuret0 -1.690  -19.934 ** 
 (5.589)  (7.541)  
Ego Network Closure Square t0 2.030  13.607 ** 
 (3.744)  (4.887)  
Structural Holes t0 .327  -2.871  
 (3.746)  (4.272)  
Structural Holes Square t0 -6.029 * -2.246  
 (3.01)  (4.279)  
Peripheral Position t0 15.972 * 28.253 * 
 (7.396)  (14.314)  
Peripheral Position Square t0 -.651  -8.859 † 
 (3.812)  (4.892)  
Strength of Ties t0 x Ego Network Closure t0 -5.747  -4.898  
 (4.206)  (5.288)  
Strength of Ties t0 x Structural Holes t0 16.161 * 18.887 * 
 (7.199)  (9.136)  
Strength of Ties t0 x Peripheral Position t0 -26.799 † -35.321  
 (14.095)  (27.269)  
Fast vs. slow technological change t0 -.211 ** -.202 * 
 (0.069)  (0.096)  
Few vs. many documented knowledge t0 -.123  -.036  
 (0.079)  (0.121)  
Job engagement t0 .311  .430  
 (0.201)  (0.301)  
Hierarchical position t0 .205 † .075  
 (0.117)  (0.167)  
Highest education
 t0 -.008  .014  
 (0.111)  (0.147)  
Work experience in years t0 .020 † .022  
 (0.012)  (0.015)  
Average inventors per patent t0 .485 *** .333 *** 
 (0.07)  (0.087)  
Average priority year per patent t0 -.140  -.139  
 (0.112)  (0.16)  
Number of patents
 t0 .137 *** .135 *** 
 (0.016)  (0.019)  
Patent Collaboration Network Size t0 .041 ** .004  
 (0.014)  (0.021)  
Ego Network Size t0 -5.509 † -9.364 * 
 (2.927)  (3.707)  
Amount of external contacts in Ego networks t0 -1.590 * -1.018  
 (0.686)  (0.814)  
_cons 266.758  270.593  
 (224.511)  (321.695)  
Pseudo R2 .1676   .2129   
LR chi2 205.40 *** 148.07 *** 
Log likelihood -510.01  -273.76  
Likelihood-ratio test (df) 17.89 ***  13.88 **  
N 142   142   
Legend:  
Negative binomial regression 
*** p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, † p < .10 
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Appendix 
Table A-1  
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Forward patent citations
 t5 5.86 10.72 .00 44               
2 Backward patent citationst5 43.86 64.50 .00 279 .758              
3 Strength of Ties
 t0 .46 . 05 .35 .66 .051 .000             
4 Ego Network Closuret0 .58 .15 .16 1 -.055 -.105 -.018            
5 Structural Holes
 t0 .37 .19 .03 1 .162 .177 .092 .016           
6 Peripheral Positiont0 .50 .14 .00 1 -.032 -.039 -.140 -.022 .041          
7 Fast vs. slow technological change
 t0 .04 1.93 -3 3 .027 .020 .161 -.108 -.203 -.158         
8 Few vs. many documented knowledge
 t0 .26 1.55 -3 3 -.069 -.181 -.088 .108 -.295 -.133 .300        
9 Job engagement
 t0 2.64 .88 0 4 -.034 -.001 .015 .174 -.204 .213 .051 .099       
10 Hierarchical position
 t0 2.27 .96 1 5 -.006 .088 -.002 .027 -.122 .265 .114 -.003 .338      
11 Highest education
 t0 2.27 .93 1 5 .005 -.041 -.175 -.183 -.055 .170 .095 .268 .076 .239     
12 Work experience in years
 t0 23.90 10.58 7 46 -.128 -.092 .018 .272 .053 .260 .030 -.027 .389 .292 -.025    
13 Average inventors per patent
 t0 2.68 2.40 0 8.33 .403 .455 -.172 -.147 .375 .020 -.134 -.257 -.129 -.090 -.054 -.146   
14 Average priority year per patent t0 2006.31 .85 2004 2009 .028 .049 .029 .099 -.092 .165 .043 .126 .305 .031 -.030 .064 -.025  
15 Number of patents
 t0 6.43 8.91 0 43 .627 .906 .008 -.079 .193 -.094 -.115 -.210 .026 .065 -.034 -.128 .385 .136 
Legend:  
N obs 142
 41
 
